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IN RE FLANAGAN: GRAND JURY SECRECY AND
FEAR OF FOREIGN INCRIMINATION
INTRODUCTION
In In re Flanagan,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit adopted the view that Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 6(e)'s provisions for the secrecy of grand jury testimony2 do not
1. 691 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1982).
2. When Flanagan was decided, Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) read:
(e) RECORDING AND DIsCLOsuRE OF PROCEEDINGS.
(2) General Rule of Secrecy. A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an
operator of recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attor-
ney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under para-
graph (3)(A)(ii) of this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before the
grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules. No obligation of
secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. A
knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court.
(3) Exceptions.
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the
grand jury, other than its deliberations and the vote of any grand juror, may be
made to-
(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such attorney's
duty; and
(ii) such government personnel as are deemed necessary by an attorney for the
government to assist an attorney for the government in the performance of such
attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law.
(B) Any person to whom matters are disclosed under subparagraph (A)(ii) of this
paragraph shall not utilize that grand jury material for any purpose other than
assisting the attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's
duty to enforce federal criminal law. An attorney for the government shall
promptly provide the district court, before which was impaneled the grand jury
whose material has been so disclosed, with the names of the persons to whom such
disclosure has been made.
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited bI this rule of matters occurring before the
grand jury may also be made-
(i) when so directed by a court preliminary to or in connection with a judicial
proceeding; or
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a showing
that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters
occurring before the grand jury.
If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury, the dis-
closure shall be made in such manner, at such time, and under such conditions as
the court may direct.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), 18 U.S.C. app. (1982).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3), creating exceptions to the general rule of grand jury secrecy,
was added in 1977, before Flanagan, but after several cases necessary to understanding the
importance of Flanagan: Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S.
472 (1972), see infra text accompanying notes 17-19; Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52 (1964), see infra text accompanying notes 31-36; In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806 (5th
Cir. 1972), cert denied, 410 U.S. 914 (1973), see infra text accompanying notes 55-57; In re
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fully protect a witness from self-incrimination in a subsequent foreign
criminal proceeding.3 In taking this position, the Second Circuit
rejected contrary holdings by four other circuits.4
Compelling a witness to give testimony that would lead to prose-
cution in a foreign tribunal may violate the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. 5 If the fifth amendment privilege does pro-
tect a witness from the risk of self-incrimination in a foreign prosecu-
tion, it would follow from the Second Circuit's view of rule 6(e) that
grand jury secrecy does not substitute for the privilege when there is a
real and substantial risk of foreign prosecution. In such cases, the
prosecution would be unable to compel a grand jury witness to testify
by granting him immunity from prosecution. Neither rule 6(e) secrecy
nor immunity would effectively protect the witness from foreign
prosecution.
In Flanagan, despite a grant of immunity from prosecution in the
United States, Martin Flanagan, an unindicted co-conspirator in an
international gun-running case,6 refused to testify before a federal
grand jury, claiming that his testimony would incriminate him and
subject him to prosecution in the United Kingdom or Ireland. 7 Flana-
gan argued that despite rule 6(e)'s requirement of secrecy in federal
grand jury proceedings, other governments could discover his grand
Parker, 411 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1969), vacated as moot, 397 U.S. 96 (1970), see infra text
accompanying notes 22-26; and In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1972), see
infra text accompanying notes 41-49.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) was amended in 1983. The amendments are intended to improve
the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 advisory committee notes to
1983 amendments, 97 F.R.D. 245, 260-61 (1983). The 1983 amendments do not affect the
force of the Flanagan court's findings regarding the possible application of the fifth amend-
ment privilege. The 1983 amendments merely codify secrecy procedures that district
courts already employed at the time Flanagan was decided. The Second Circuit considered
these procedures in Flanagan, but found them to be inadequate to guarantee nondisclosure.
691 F.2d at 120-22. See infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
3. 691' F.2d at 23-24.
4. Before Flanagan, courts in the following cases held that Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) fully
protects a federal grand jury witness against the use of his testimony in a foreign criminal
prosecution: In re Baird, 668 F.2d 432, 434 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 982 (1982);
United States v. Brummitt, 665 F.2d 521, 525-26 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 977
(1982); In re Postal, 559 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978);
In re Weir, 495 F.2d 879, 881 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974); United States v.
Armstrong, 476 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1973); In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806, 811 (5th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 914 (1973); and In re Parker, 411 F.2d at 1069 (10th Cir.
1969). See also In re Federal Grand Jury Witness (Lemieux), 597 F.2d 1166, 1168 (9th Cir.
1979) (Hufstedler, J., specially concurring); Phoenix Assur. Co. of Canada v. Runck, 317
N.W.2d 402, 413 (N.D.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 862 (1982). Before Flanagan, only the
court in Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. at 1082-83, held that Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) alone does not
adequately protect a witness.
5. "No person shall. . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself ... .. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
7. 691 F.2d at 118-19.
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jury testimony and use it against him. While the court held that
Flanagan faced no real and substantial danger of prosecution abroad,8
it agreed that rule 6(e) does not completely protect grand jury testi-
mony from disclosure to foreign governments and thus does not elimi-
nate the possibility of foreign prosecution based upon that testimony.9
By recognizing rule 6(e) as inadequate, Flanagan raises the ques-
tion of the applicability of the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination when there is potential danger of a foreign prosecution
based on federal grand jury testimony. Courts in prior cases avoided
the constitutional issue by holding that rule 6(e) adequately protects
grand jury proceedings from disclosure to foreign governments. 10 By
rejecting this view, the Second Circuit has laid the foundation for a
direct ruling on the applicability of the fifth amendment when the wit-
ness faces a substantial risk of prosecution abroad.
This Note addresses the issue the Flanagan court left open-
whether the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is
available to a federal grand jury witness who is in danger of foreign
criminal prosecution-and concludes that the privilege should be
available to such a witness. Section I reviews the pre-Flanagan cases
that held that rule 6(e) secrecy alone removes any serious risk of
incrimination in a foreign prosecution. Section II compares the
approach taken in these cases with the Flanagan analysis. This Note
concludes that the Flanagan analysis is preferable, because it better




A. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND FOREIGN INCRIMINATION
With increasing frequency, witnesses before United States courts
and grand juries have attempted to avoid testifying by invoking the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, claiming that
their testimony would subject them to prosecution in a foreign tribu-
nal. 1 When a witness is reluctant to testify for fear of incrimination
8. 691 F.2d at 121-22. Any witness seeking to invoke the fifth amendment privilege
must show that fear of prosecution based upon his testimony is "real and substantial."
California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 429 (1971); Manchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53
(1968). For a description of the factors weighed in this inquiry, see Note, United States v.
Flanagan: Guidelines for Determining Real Risk of Foreign Prosecution, 10 BRooKLYN J.
INT'L L. 219 (1984). See infra note 88.
9. 691 F.2d at 122-24.
10. See supra note 4.
11. The first case in which a witness raised such a claim was In re Parker, 411 F.2d
1067 (10th Cir. 1969). Since then about a dozen such cases have arisen. See supra note 4,
infra notes 92, 95.
1984]
360 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
in a domestic prosecution, the common prosecutorial practice is to
grant the witness "use immunity" in exchange for his testimony.12
Under this practice the government receives necessary testimony, and
the possibility of any future prosecution of the witness based upon this
testimony is eliminated. When the prosecution grants use immunity,
it can compel testimony without violating the witness' fifth amend-
ment rights, because the testimony does not incriminate the witness.
Use immunity replaces the fifth amendment privilege; their protec-
tions are coextensive.13 But a grant of immunity from prosecution in
the United States does not protect against foreign prosecution. A
court in the United States cannot compel a foreign tribunal to honor a
domestic grant of immunity,1 4 and a grant of immunity in the United
States does not bar extradition by the United States.15 Therefore, wit-
nesses who fear incrimination abroad continue to claim the fifth
amendment privilege even when granted immunity from domestic
prosecution. 16
The Supreme Court faced this issue only once, in Zicarelli v. New
Jersey State Commission of Investigation.1 7 In Zicarelli a witness
before a state investigating commission refused to testify publicly,
despite a grant of immunity, on the ground that his testimony would
incriminate him abroad. The Court determined that the witness could
answer truthfully all the questions he was asked without revealing
information that would incriminate him abroad. 8 Thus, the Court
did not reach the question of whether a witness in danger of prosecu-
tion abroad is entitled to fifth amendment protection.19 Moreover,
Zicarelli involved testimony in a court, a public forum, not a grand
12. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453, (1972), established that a court may
constitutionally compel a witness who has been granted "use immunity"-permitting sub-
sequent prosecution of the witness but prohibiting use of his testimony or evidence derived
therefrom in the prosecution-to testify because use immunity provides protections coex-
tensive with those the fifth amendment provides. See also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n,
378 U.S. 52 (immunity employed to compel testimony must be binding in all jurisdictions
in the U.S.). See infra text accompanying notes 31-36.
13. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453.
14. "[N]o domestic governmeiht has the legal power to bar prosecution of [a witness] by
a foreign country or to prevent the use against him in such a prosecution of testimony
immunized from use against him in domestic criminal proceedings." Flanagan, 691 F.2d at
121.
15. See, eg., Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 124 (noting absence of statute forbidding extradi-
tion of an immune witness). See also Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122-23 (1901)
(absence of constitutional guarantees in country requesting extradition is not a defense to
extradition); Gallina v. Fraser, 177 F. Supp. 856, 866 (D. Conn. 1959) (same), aff'd, 278
F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960). See generally Note, Testimony Incrimi-
nating Under the Laws of a Foreign Country--Is There a Right to Remain Silent?, 11
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 359, 371-72 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Right to Remain Silent].
16. See, e.g., Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116.
17. 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
18. Id at 480.
19. Id at 478-81.
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jury proceeding under rule 6(e)'s secrecy requirements. Several cases
with similar facts also have not presented the fifth amendment issue,
because the witness failed to show a real and substantial risk of prose-
cution abroad. 20
Other cases in which witnesses have refused to testify for fear of
foreign prosecution have arisen in the federal grand jury setting. The
courts in all grand jury cases prior to Flanagan held that the secrecy
that rule 6(e) requires for grand jury proceedings removes any risk
that the testimony will be revealed to foreign authorities and so
removes any real and substantial risk of prosecution abroad. 21 Such a
determination precludes consideration of the constitutional issue.
Two courts addressed the fifth amendment issue before Flanagan
and reached conflicting conclusions. In In re Parker,22 the Tenth Cir-
cuit rejected a grand jury witness' assertion that her fifth amendment
protections included avoidance of self-incrimination before a Canadian
tribunal. The Tenth Circuit first rejected the claim on the basis that
rule 6(e) rendered the testimony unavailable to Canadian authorities.2 3
As an alternative ground for its decision, the court stated that the fifth
amendment "need not and should not be interpreted as applying to
acts made criminal by the laws of a foreign nation."'2 4 The Parker
court is the only court that has expressed this view, and it cited no
authority for it.25 Most other courts have followed Parker's first line
of reasoning, that grand jury secrecy adequately protects the witness,
20. See, eg., Fonseca v. Regan, 98 F.R.D. 694, 702 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); United States v.
Maikovskis, No. M18-304 (S.D.N.Y. March 10, 1978); United States v. Yanagita, 552 F.2d
940, 946-47 (2d Cir. 1977). For cases in which district courts have found the fifth amend-
ment applicable in public forums, see infra note 36.
21. See supra note 4; infra note 36.
22. 411 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1969), vacated as moot, 397 U.S. 96 (1970).
23. Id. at 1069-70.
24. Id. at 1070.
25. The Tenth Circuit offered only cryptic reasoning in support of its position. The
court rejected the argument that in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, the
Supreme Court implicitly extended the fifth amendment privilege to witnesses fearing for-
eign prosecution. 411 F.2d at 1070. The Murphy Court stated that the fifth amendment
privilege derived from the English privilege against self-incrimination, which extends to
such witnesses. See infra text accompanying notes 31-33. The Tenth Circuit argued that
Murphy's reference to the English privilege "was simply by way of argumentative analogy
... and carries no persuasion." 411 F.2d at 1070. Other courts have accepted the inter-
pretation of Murphy that the Parker court rejected. See infra notes 33-36 and accompany-
ing text. Two district courts have directly rejected the Parker court's rationale. See United
States v. Trucis, 89 F.R.D. 671, 673 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (deposition in suit to revoke naturali-
zation) ("[he privilege is not simply a limit on the activities of American courts and law
enforcement authorities: it is a freedom conferred upon persons within the protection of
American law."); In re Letters Rogatory from the 9th Crim. Div. Regional Ct., Mannheim,
448 F. Supp. 786, 790 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (sworn testimony to be taken in United States for
use in German criminal proceeding; court must "assess its citizens' susceptibility to future
prosecutions either foreign or domestic").
19841
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and have thus avoided the constitutional question. 26
In In re Cardassi27 a district court held directly contrary to
Parker. The court first granted Cardassi, a federal grand jury witness,
immunity from prosecution. But Cardassi still refused to testify,
claiming that her answers would subject her to prosecution in Mexico.
The court found that, unlike the witness in Zicarelli, Cardassi would
face a real and substantial risk of incrimination abroad if her testi-
mony were to reach foreign officials.28 The court further found that
rule 6(e) did not sufficiently protect her from foreign prosecution.29
The court held the fifth amendment applicable when a witness fears
incrimination in a foreign country and that Cardassi had a right to
refuse to testify.30
The Cardassi court based its holding on precedent that applied to
that case only by analogy. The court relied on Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission,31 in which the Supreme Court defined the scope of the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination in a domestic situ-
ation. The Murphy Court held that a state's grant of immunity must
preclude prosecution of the witness in federal court as well, and vice-
versa.32 Murphy thus extended the immunity beyond the jurisdiction
where the witness is questioned to all other jurisdictions in the United
States. The Murphy Court found support for its holding in English
law, from which the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion derived. 33 The English privilege extended not only to those who
feared incrimination in England, but also to those who feared incrimi-
nation in other countries. Murphy cites the leading English case of
United States v. McRae34 as authority for this English rule.35 The
Cardassi court reasoned that Murphy, by accepting the English con-
struction of the privilege, "clearly makes the privilege a protection
26. See infra notes 50-64 and accompanying text.
27. 351 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1972).
28. Id. at 1083-84.
29. Id. at 1082-83.
30. Id at 1084-85.
31. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
32. Id at 77-79.
33. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. at 453. See supra note 12. The Murphy
decision also is based on policy grounds, see infra text accompanying notes 105-08, and
federal precedent. See, e.g., United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931) (federal gov-
ernment can compel testimony that might be incriminating under state law). The Court,
however, distinguished Murdock and asserted that it was returning to a view of the fifth
amendment privilege that the Court had held in earlier cases. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 59-60,
65, 70-77. See, e.g., Ballman v. Fagin, 200 U.S. 186 (1906) (defendants not bound to dis-
close matters in federal court that would expose them to criminal penalties in state court);
United States v. Saline Bank of Va., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 100 (1828) (defendants not bound to
disclose matters in federal court that would expose them to criminal penalties in state
court).
34. 3 L.R.-Ch. App. 79 (1867).
35. 378 U.S. at 61-63.
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against foreign prosecution. '36
Two other district courts37 and legal commentators 3 have
responded favorably to the Cardassi rule. Flanagan has opened the
door for its acceptance in the Second Circuit. Adoption of Cardassi
and rejection of Parker would depend upon both a court's finding that
the fifth amendment protects against incrimination in a foreign tribu-
nal3 9 and its concluding that the secrecy requirements of rule 6(e) are
insufficient to protect the witness from foreign prosecution.
B. THE PROTECTION OF, THE GRAND JURY SECRECY AND
FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 6(e)
Like the Tenth Circuit in Parker, most federal courts consider the
secrecy protections of rule 6(e) sufficient to preclude a witness from
invoking the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.40
Not until Cardassi was it recognized that rule 6(e) and grants of
immunity together afford witnesses protections against self-incrimina-
tion that are coextensive with the constitutional privilege.41 The
Cardassi court correctly noted that the combination of rule 6(e) and
grants of immunity is effective only in purely domestic situations,
because federal or state grants of immunity have no force in other
countries. 42
The Cardassi court focused on the possibility of wrongful disclo-
sure by government officials of a grand jury witness' testimony.43 The
immunity that can protect the witness from such wrongful disclosure
by government officials is available only in the domestic context,
where future prosecution of the witness always is subject to judicial
control. The Cardassi court stated:
36. 351 F. Supp. at 1085. Two district courts have adopted Cardassi's interpretation of
Murphy and have extended the constitutional privilege to public, non-grand jury forums
where a witness feared foreign prosecution. United States v. Trucis, 89 F.R.D. 671 (deposi-
tions in suit to revoke naturalization); Mishima v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 131 (D.
Alaska 1981) (Coast Guard investigation of navigation accident). The privilege also was
extended in In re Letters Rogatory from the 9th Crim. Div. Regional Ct., Mannheim, 448
F. Supp. 786, but without direct reliance on the Cardassi court's reading of Murphy.
37. Trucis, 89 F.R.D. 671; Mishima, 507 F. Supp. 131. See supra note 36.
38. Right to Remain Silent, supra note 15, at 369-70, 383-85; Note, Fear of Foreign
Prosecution and the Fifth Amendment, 58 IOWA L. REV. 1304, 1315-16 (1973); Note, The
Fifth Amendment Protects a Witness Who Refuses to Testify for Fear of Self-Incrimination
Under the Laws of a Foreign Jurisdiction: In re Cardassi, 5 RUT.-CAM. L. J. 146, passim
(1973).
39. See supra notes 22-38 and accompanying text; infra notes 102-26 and accompany-
ing text.
40. See supra notes 4, 23-26 and accompanying text.
41. Cardassi, 351 F.Supp. at 1082-83.
42. Id. at 1083. See also supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
43. Id. at 1082-83.
1984]
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The existence of this judicial control was what persuaded the [Supreme] Court
in Kastigar [v. United States] that the self-incrimination privilege could be dis-
placed by a grant of use-immunity. "A person accorded this immunity under
18 U.S.C. § 6002 and subsequently prosecuted, is not dependent for the preser-
vation of his rights upon the integrity and good faith of the prosecuting
authorities" . . . . Rule 6(e) provides no similar protection, yet it is the sole
safeguard the Government can offer a witness who fears his compelled testi-
mony may be used against him in foreign courts where the domestic judicial
bar on use and derivative use of compelled testimony is unenforceable.
44
The court acknowledged that government officials who make such dis-
closures are subject to court-imposed disciplinary measures.45 But the
court reasoned that "such an after-the-fact sanction would provide no
protection to the witness" from foreign prosecution.46 Because Amer-
ican courts cannot prevent a foreign court from hearing a trial that is
based on improper disclosures by American officials, the Cardassi
court held rule 6(e) inadequate to replace the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination in that situation. 47 The Cardassi court, hav-
ing found that the witness faced a real and substantial risk of prosecu-
tion abroad,48 held that under the fifth amendment the witness could
refuse to testify.49
Except for the Cardassi and Flanagan courts, all other federal
courts have adhered to the Parker position, that rule 6(e) alone pro-
tects the witness sufficiently from incrimination abroad. The Tenth
Circuit reaffirmed its Parker ruling,50 and the Fifth, 51 Eighth,52 and
Ninth53 Circuits also adhere to Parker. These courts all have recog-
nized the possibility of wrongful disclosure of grand jury testimony
and the absence of post-disclosure safeguards. But they view the risks
44. Id. at 1083 (quoting Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460). 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982) prohibits a
witness who has received immunity from refusing to testify on the basis of self-incrimina-
tion and prohibits the use of the immunized testimony "in any criminal case" except for
perjury or failing to comply with the order to testify.
45. Id. at 1082.
46. Id
47. Id. at 1082-83.
48. Throughout its discussion of the witness' concern with foreign prosecution, the
Cardassi court focused on the subjective reasonableness of this concern rather than the
objective likelihood of disclosure and prosecution abroad.
[This] court must determine "from the circumstances of the case and the nature of
the evidence which the witness is called to give, that there is a reasonable ground to
apprehend danger." But "if the fact of the witness being in danger be once made to
appear, great latitude should be allowed him in judging for himself of the effect of
any particular question."
351 F. Supp. at 1084 n.6 (quoting The Queen v. Boyes, 121 Eng. Rep. 730, 738 (1861)).
49. 351 F. Supp. at 1084-86.
50. In re Nigro, 705 F.2d 1224 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 927 (1983).
51. United States v. Brummitt, 665 F.2d at 525-26; In re Postal, 559 F.2d at 236,
United States v. Armstrong, 476 F.2d at 316; In re Tierney, 465 F.2d at 811.
52. In re Baird, 668 F.2d at 434.
53. In re Grand Jury Witness (Lemieux), 597 F.2d at 1168 (Hufstedler, J., specially
concurring); In re Weir, 495 F.2d at 881.
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of disclosure as so slight that they "do not rise above remote possibili-
ties"54 and thus have no constitutional significance. In In re Tierney,55
for example, the Fifth Circuit conceded that a court may order disclo-
sure of grand jury testimony.5 6 Nevertheless, the court maintained
that in such situations the trial court can prevent public disclosure by
using preliminary in camera hearings, or by otherwise restricting
access to the testimony, even if that would destroy the prosecutor's
case.57 In cases before the Fifth5 8 and Eighth59 Circuits, defendants
have argued that rule 6(e), as amended in 1977,60 allows some to cir-
cumvent the general rule of grand jury secrecy. The rule permits dis-
closure of grand jury testimony without a court order to U.S.
prosecutors for use in enforcing federal criminal law and to "such gov-
ernment personnel" as a federal prosecutor deems necessary to assist
him in the performance of his duties.61 Again, the courts were not
convinced of rule 6(e)'s inadequacy, reasoning that the 1977 amend-
ment does not authorize disclosure to foreign officials without a court
order.62 The Eighth Circuit also emphasized the trial court's discre-
tion to deny a disclosure order when the testimony may incriminate
the witness in a foreign country.6 3 More commonly, federal courts
have avoided ruling on the adequacy of rule 6(e)'s secrecy protections
by finding that a witness' testimony does not give rise to a real and
substantial threat of foreign prosecution."
II
FLANAGAN AND SUBSEQUENT CASES
A. IN RE FLANAGAN
The district court opinion in Flanagan mirrors Cardassi in rea-
54. Nigro, 705 F.2d at 1228.
55. 465 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1972).
56. The Tierney court noted that a defendant in a criminal trial can demand disclosure
of any exculpatory grand jury testimony and of a trial witness' grand jury testimony
regarding matters testified to on direct examination. Id at 812. Rule 6(e) was amended in
1977 to allow disclosure in these circumstances. FED. R. CRiM. P. 6 (e)(3)(C)(i), (ii). See
supra note 2.
57. Tierney, 465 F.2d at 812.
58. Brummitt, 665 F.2d at 524-25 (placing immunized testimony under seal).
59. Baird, 668 F.2d at 433.
60. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3) (exceptions to secrecy requirement).
61. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii).
62. Baird, 668 F.2d at 433-34; Brurnmitt, 665 F.2d at 526. But see In re Federal Grand
Jury Witness (Lemieux), 597 F.2d at 1168-69 (Hufstedler, J., specially concurring) (grand
jury information can be shared with foreign authorities).
63. Baird, 668 F.2d at 434. See also Nigro, 705 F.2d at 1228.
64. See, e.g., In re Quinn, 525 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1975); United States v. Doe, 361 F.
Supp. 226 (E.D. Pa.), affid sub nom. In re Cahalane, 485 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1973) (mem.),
cert denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974).
1984]
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soning and result.65 The district court, citing Cardassi, held rule 6(e)
insufficient to supplant Flanagan's fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.6 6 Judge McLaughlin ruled that there was an
appreciable risk of disclosure of Flanagan's testimony to a foreign gov-
ernment despite the strictures of rule 6(e). 67 Penalties for breach of
secrecy, even if rigorously imposed, would provide no meaningful pro-
tection to Flanagan from foreign prosecution. 68 The court determined
that Flanagan faced a real and substantial risk of foreign prosecution
based on his grand jury testimony.69 Hence, given the inadequacy of
rule 6(e) and the finding that Flanagan was in danger of foreign
incrimination, the court followed Cardassi and permitted him to assert
his fifth amendment privilege. 70
The Second Circuit reversed, 71 finding that Flanagan's fear of for-
eign prosecution was "remote and speculative rather than real, reason-
able, or substantial. ' 72 The prosecution could thus seek to compel
Flanagan's immunized testimony, through a contempt proceeding to
enforce its subpoena. The court reserved the constitutional question of
the availability of the privilege to a witness with a well-founded fear of
foreign prosecution, but it emphasized that rule 6(e) secrecy alone can-
not remove any real or substantial risk of foreign prosecution. 73
The Second Circuit adopted the reasoning of the district court
and of Cardassi in assessing the adequacy of grand jury secrecy. 74 The
Second Circuit's Flanagan decision also responds to other courts' criti-
cism of the Cardassi decision. The Flanagan court first noted, as had
the Cardassi court, that it is impossible to prevent completely the inad-
vertent or wrongful disclosure of grand jury proceedings. 75 The
Flanagan court recognized that the 1977 amendments to rule 6(e)
increase the risk of unauthorized disclosure, because they allow the





69. Membership in the Irish Republican Army was the only criminal activity in Ire-
land and the United Kingdom that Flanagan's testimony would have revealed. Id. at 965
n.8.
70. Id at 965-66.
71. Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116.
72. Id at 121-22.
73. Id at 124.
74. Id at 122-24.
75. Id at 123. The court cited the following examples of cases involving disclosure of
grand jury material: In re Grand Jury Investigation (Lance), 610 F.2d 202, 220 (5th Cir.
1980); United States v. Bazzano, 570 F.2d 1120, 1123-28 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 917 (1978); In re Biaggi, 478 F.2d 489, 492 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Marcello,
508 F. Supp. 586, 597 (E.D. La. 1981); United States v. Lawson, 502 F. Supp. 158, 167 (D.
Md. 1980); In re Archuleta, 432 F. Supp. 583, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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prosecutor to disclose grand jury proceedings to other government
personnel to assist him in his work.76 The court then listed various
situations in which a court might authorize disclosure. For example,
grand jury testimony may be released to a criminal defendant if it is
exculpatory, 77 or if it is the grand jury testimony of a trial witness and
relates to matters raised in direct examination. 78 Courts have permit-
ted disclosure of testimony relevant to a motion to quash an indict-
ment,79 to a claim of double jeopardy, to a challenge to a search
warrant, 80 to a post-conviction proceeding, 81 and even to private
litigation. 82 Given these possibilities of disclosure-and the lack of
judicial protection if testimony is disclosed 83 -the Flanagan court
concluded that a factual inquiry is necessary in each case to assess a
witness' claim of possible foreign prosecution.84
The Second Circuit inquired into the risk of disclosure of Flana-
gan's grand jury testimony because, unlike the courts in Parker and its
progeny, the Second Circuit did not believe that rule 6(e)'s secrecy
requirements automatically provide the protection the fifth amend-
ment requires.
Absent a law to the effect that a witness who gives testimony pursuant to a
grant of immunity may not be extradited we are relegated to determining in
each case whether the risk is sufficiently substantial to justify a real fear that
the evidence might incriminate the witness in a foreign prosecution.
85
The Second Circuit concluded on the facts that there was no real and
substantial risk of foreign prosecution,8 6 not that rule 6(e) secrecy
makes foreign prosecution a remote risk-the Parker rationale.8 7 The
critical distinction of the Flanagan approach is that in assessing the
risk of foreign prosecution, the court assumed a serious possibility that
the testimony would be disclosed.88 The court held against Flanagan,
76. Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 123 (citing United States v. Bazzano, 570 F.2d 1120, 1123-
28 (3d Cir. 1977) (unauthorized disclosure by FBI agent); United States v. Lawson, 502 F.
Supp. 158, 167 (D. Md. 1980) (unauthorized disclosure by DEA agent)).
77. Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 123 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecu-
tor's disclosure responsibilities)).
78. Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 123 (citing FED. R. CLUM. P. 26.2).
79. Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 123 (citing United States v. Garcia, 420 F.2d 309 (2d Cir.
1970)).
80. Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 123 (citing United States v. Hughes, 413 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir.
1969)).
81. Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 123 (citing United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 662 (2d
Cir. 1978), on remand, 463 F. Supp. 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affid, 620 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1980)).
82. Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 124 (citing Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441
U.S. 211, 220 (1979); United States v. Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677 (1958)).
83. Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 123-24. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47.
84. Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 124.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 121-24.
87. Parker, 411 F.2d at 1069-70.
88. The court considered five factors in assessing Flanagan's claim:
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but only after undertaking a detailed review of the testimony that he
would probably give and the danger of prosecution in the event of
disclosure, an approach well beyond a blanket rule based on an evalua-
tion of the sufficiency of rule 6(e).89 This case-by-case approach opens
the possibility of a direct holding in a future case on the applicability
of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. If in a
future case the Second Circuit finds that a grand jury witness would
face a real and substantial risk of foreign prosecution, the applicability
of the privilege will be directly in issue.
Judge Van Graafeiland's concurring opinion highlights the new
approach taken by the majority.90 Agreeing that Flanagan faced no
real and substantial risk of foreign prosecution, Judge Van Graafei-
land took exception to the majority's reasoning that despite rule 6(e), a
real and substantial risk of foreign prosecution could be shown in a
future case. Instead, he maintained that if rule 6(e) is properly
enforced, "the likelihood is that the tradition of grand jury secrecy
• . . will hot be cavalierly disregarded." 91
B. CASES AFTER FLANAGAN
The Tenth Circuit explicitly rejected the Flanagan approach in
In re Nigro92 and instead adhered to Parker's assessment of the ade-
quacy of rule 6(e). The Nigro court discussed Flanagan's concern that
[The court in resolving the issue must then focus upon such questions as whether
there is an existing or potential foreign prosecution of him; what foreign charges
could be filed against him; whether prosecution of them would be initiated or fur-
thered by his testimony; whether any such charges would entitle the foreign juris-
diction to have him extradited from the United States; and whether there is a
likelihood that his testimony given here would be disclosed to the foreign govern-
ment.
691 F.2d at 121. Contrary to the district court's ruling, the Second Circuit ruled that in
each of these areas Flanagan's claim was deficient. There was no "present or prospective"
foreign prosecution awaiting Flanagan. Id. at 124. In marked contrast to the facts in
Cardassi, the grand jury questions in Flanagan were limited to Flanagan's activities in the
United States; this put Irish or British jurisdiction over any of his possible criminal activi-
ties in serious doubt. Id. at 122. Flanagan offered no evidence of any Irish or British law
that would criminalize his activities in the United States, nor did he show that Ireland or
the United Kingdom claimed any jurisdiction over these activities. Id. Flanagan offered
no evidence to show that any extraditable crimes might be revealed by his testimony; the
one activity clearly implicated that was criminal in Ireland and the United Kingdom-
membership in the Irish Republican Army-was non-extraditable. Id.
89. If the Flanagan decision retreats from Cardassi at all, it is in adding steps that can
be taken to minimize the risk of disclosure. The Flanagan court noted that the trial court
could seal the transcript of the testimony to help prevent disclosure. Id. at 124. The court
stated that the government had narrowed the risk of disclosure by its assurance that it
would not reveal Flanagan's testimony to foreign officials, and that it "would, on the con-
trary, oppose any effort to extradite [Flanagan] to face foreign charges that might be
derived from his testimony." Id.
90. Id. at 124-25. (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 125.
92. 705 F.2d 1224 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 927 (1983).
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grand jury testimony could be disclosed in several ways regardless of
court authorization but concluded that these "suggestions do not rise
above remote possibilities. ' 93 The availability of the fifth amendment
privilege to a grand jury witness who fears foreign prosecution is thus
unlikely to arise in the Tenth Circuit because, as in Parker, the court
views rule 6(e) as a sufficient safeguard against disclosure and subse-
quent incrimination. 94
The Second Circuit followed its Flanagan approach in In re
Gilboe.95 Gilboe, a grand jury witness with immunity, refused to
answer questions regarding fraudulent activity in the international
shipping industry, activity for which he had already been convicted
and had received a twenty-year sentence in the United States. The
Gilboe court followed Flanagan in stating that rule 6(e) secrecy alone
does not provide adequate protection from foreign incrimination and
in its inquiry into other factors affecting the substantiality of the wit-
ness' fears. 96 The court emphasized that foreign prosecution was
unlikely because Gilboe had a lengthy prison sentence to serve before
he would be available for extradition and trial abroad.97 The slight
chance of a grand jury leak, Gilboe's lengthy sentence, the absence of
any "current or planned" prosecutions in other countries, and the
"overwhelming independent evidence" of his guilt, was not enough to
make Gilboe's risk of prosecution real and substantial. 98 Thus, Gilboe,
like Flanagan, did not present the issue of the fifth amendment's appli-
cability to a witness whose fear of foreign prosecution is real and
substantial. 99
Gilboe may be read as a slight retreat from Flanagan. The Gilboe
decision emphasizes that the measures available to a court to guard
grand jury secrecy are substantial.l °° Furthermore, Gilboe quotes
Judge Van Graafeiland's concurrence in Flanagan to support the
93. 705 F.2d at 1228.
94. The Tenth Circuit may not have been satisfied completely by this rationale. Recog-
nizing the witness' "hesitancy" to testify, the court recommended that the district court
require an oath of secrecy from every grand jury participant, seal testimony transcripts, and
review any requests for disclosure in camera, "zealously" guarding the witness' immunity.
Id.
95. 699 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1983).
96. Id. at 75-78. See supra note 88.
97. Id. at 76-77.
98. Id. at 78.
99. See also Fonseca v. Regan, 98 F.R.D. 694 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). The witness in that
case refused to answer interrogatories or appear for deposition, claiming that his responses
could incriminate him abroad. The court compelled discovery, because it found no evi-
dence that the prospect of foreign prosecution was real and substantial. Id. at 702. Since
Fonseca was a civil case, the issue of grand jury secrecy did not arise, but the court followed
"the test established in United States v. Flanagan" for evaluating the possibility of prosecu-
tion in a foreign country. Id.
100. 699 F.2d at 78.
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proposition that disregard of the grand jury secrecy rule is unlikely if
courts stringently enforce it.101 Even if Gilboe restricts Flanagan,
Gilboe still allows the possibility that a grand jury witness will be able
to show a real and substantial risk of prosecution abroad. The Second
Circuit, therefore, has maintained a position contrary to Parker and, if
presented with a witness in danger of foreign prosecution, would prob-
ably confront the issue of the applicability of the fifth amendment.
III
ANALYSIS
A. THE SUFFICIENCY OF GRAND JURY SECRECY UNDER RULE
6(e)
Flanagan and Parker do not differ in their interpretation of rule
6(e). The cases agree that under the rule there is a slight but ines-
capable risk of disclosure of grand jury testimony. The cases differ,
however, in their views of this risk of disclosure as a basis for a wit-
ness' risk of foreign prosecution. According to Parker, rule 6(e)'s
secrecy procedures make the risk of foreign prosecution so slight that
the witness' fear is insubstantial as a matter of law. Under the Flana-
gan approach, the court must evaluate the risk of foreign prosecution
in each case. If a grand jury witness shows that his testimony would
relate to criminal activity in a foreign country and that that country
has an interest in prosecuting the witness, a court following Flanagan
will conclude that the slight prospect of a breach of secrecy may
induce a reasonable fear of self-incrimination; a court following the
Parker rule would regard the same fear as unreasonable. Flanagan
arrives at this more lenient standard by emphasizing not only the pos-
sibility of disclosure but also, if disclosure occurs, the inadequacy of
other safeguards, primarily grants of immunity, in the international
context. Flanagan recognizes that although the risk of disclosure is
slight, the greater risk of harm in the event of disclosure calls for spe-
cial protections for the witness.
B. APPLICABILITY OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE
Courts require witnesses who invoke the fifth amendment to show
that their fear of incrimination has an objective basis. 10 2 The Flana-
101. Md
102. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971); Manchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39
(1968). See supra note 4. The Supreme Court has made clear that it always is necessary to
give the fifth amendment privilege a liberal application. To require a witness to give
detailed proof of how his testimony might incriminate him is to compel him to "surrender
the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee." Hoffman v. United
States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). See also Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950) (grand
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gan rule, particularly as interpreted in Gilboe, incorporates this
requirement. In order for a court to assess the applicability of the fifth
amendment privilege, a witness must show that the fear of foreign
prosecution is real and substantial. 10 3 But it is not clear that it is con-
stitutionally permissible for a court, in requiring some basis for the
witness' claim, to compel the witness to assume a remote risk of dis-
closure to a foreign government. The Parker approach, which recog-
nizes the risk of disclosure but finds it too insignificant to warrant
constitutional consideration,1 4 imposes such a risk upon witnesses
and thus may violate their fifth amendment rights.
The Supreme Court listed the policies underlying the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination in Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission:10 5
[1.] Our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt;
[2.] our preference for an accusatorial system of justice. . .
[3.] our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane
treatment and abuses;
[4.] our sense of fair play, which dictates "a fair state-individual balance
[5.] our respect for the inviolability of the human personality...
[6.] our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and
[7.] our realization that the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to the
guilty," is often "a protection to the innocent."
10 6
These purposes of the fifth amendment can be placed in two broad
categories, protecting the witness 10 7 and obtaining reliable
testimony. 10 8
The fifth amendment privilege protects the witness and guards
against false testimony, because it discourages "conviction-hungry"
police and prosecutors from usingf threats and force to obtain confes-
sions and convictions. 10 9 This "conviction hunger" is of less concern
jury witness not required to answer questions regarding employment in the Communist
Party, regardless of whether the answers would support conviction by themselves).
103. See supra note 8.
104. See supra text accompanying note 23.
105. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
106. Id. at 55.
107. Protecting the witness encompasses avoiding the "cruel trilemma" of self-accusa-
tion, perjury, and contempt; preference for an accusatorial system; abhorrence of inhumane
treatment and abuses to elicit incriminating statements; and fair play and respect for the
human personality. Id.
108. Obtaining reliable testimony encompasses distrust of self-deprecatory statements
and the need to protect the innocent. Id.
109. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55-56; McNaughton, Self-Incrimination Under Foreign
Law, 45 VA. L. REv. 1299, 1308-09 (1959); Right to Remain Silent, supra note 15, at 362-
66.
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when the witness has domestic immunity. The government cannot use
the testimony to convict the witness, but it can seek information on the
activities of others. Mistreatment of the witness is less likely, because
the recalcitrant witness lacks his typical motivation, fear of future
prosecution. Thus, the government's interest is to ensure reliable testi-
mony rather than to receive self-incriminating evidence from the
witness. 110
The privilege against self-incrimination protects the witness and
guards against false testimony in a second way. The Murphy Court
implied that it is a violation of a witness' rights to demand potentially
self-incriminating testimony even without brutal interrogation meth-
ods. This is the "cruel trilemma"-forcing a witness to choose among
perjury, contempt, and self-accusation." It is significant that the
Murphy Court listed this concern first, for it is central to the Court's
holding that a witness' immunity is coterminous in federal and state
courts. 11 2 A grant of immunity frees the witness from "conviction
hunger," but if he fears foreign prosecution, he may be subject to the
"cruel trilemma" despite the grant of immunity. If a witness has a
genuine fear of being prosecuted abroad on the basis of information
that he furnished, the trilemma of perjury, contempt, and self-incrimi-
nation is just as real as if the witness feared domestic prosecution.
Placing a witness in this situation does not serve the goal of efficient
law enforcement. The witness may still have an incentive to answer
falsely, although only someone actually involved in a crime would
have an incentive to deny involvement and thus escape prosecution
abroad; the innocent have no incentive to confess. 113
Because it is a violation of a witness' fifth amendment rights to
require him to answer potentially self-incriminating questions, the
Second Circuit's approach in Flanagan is preferable over the contrary
Parker rule. The fifth amendment operates in two ways; it curbs bru-
tality and other prosecutorial excesses, and it assuages the reasonable
fears that witnesses harbor toward their questioners. That govern-
mental misconduct is very unlikely is not sufficient protection for a
witness if there are no further safeguards when such misconduct does
110. See McNaughton, supra note 109, at 1308-09. But see In re Federal Grand Jury
Witness (Lemieux), 597 F.2d at 1168-69 (Hufstedler, J., specially concurring) (need for
increased international cooperation in law enforcement). See also Right to Remain Silent,
supra note 15, at 366.
111. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55.
112. Before Murphy, a major justification for the contrary rule-that a state's grant of
immunity does not bind a federal court and vice-versa-was that the only purpose of the
fifth amendment privilege was to prevent prosecutorial abuse. See McNaughton, supra
note 109, at 1308-09.
113. See Kroner, Self-Incrimination: The External Reach of the Privilege, 60 COLUM. L.
REv. 816, 838 (1960); Right to Remain Silent, supra note 15, at 355-66.
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occur. Here the governmental misconduct feared is wrongful disclo-
sure of a witness' testimony. A grant of immunity checks this fear by
guaranteeing no future domestic prosecution. No similar guarantee is
available to the witness who fears self-incrimination in a foreign tribu-
nal. Although a court can reduce the risk of disclosure by exacting
assurances of secrecy from the government, as recognized in Flana-
gan1 4 and Gilboe,1 5 such practices are not enough. A central premise
of the fifth amendment privilege is that the individual cannot be forced
to rely upon the promises of government officials to curb their wrong-
ful conduct. As the Cardassi court stated, "the constitutional protec-
tion of the witness must rest on more than faith."' 1 6
Inherent in the recognition of the inadequacy of grand jury
secrecy is a strong argument that the fifth amendment privilege should
be available to a witness who fears foreign prosecution.' 7 To compel
testimony from a witness who reasonably fears that the testimony will
incriminate him is to force him into a "cruel trilemma" whether he
fears prosecution abroad or in another domestic jurisdiction. Murphy
established that this not only invites unreliable testimony but also vio-
lates the witness' constitutional rights. Although the Supreme Court's
holding in Murphy treats only the domestic scope of the privilege, the
opinion acknowledges that the "cruel trilemma" faced by a witness is
an equally compelling reason for applying the privilege when a witness
fears foreign prosecution." 8 The Murphy Court looked to the English
rule in United States v. McRae, that the privilege applied to witnesses
who feared incrimination abroad." 9 Murphy then distinguished
another English case, Willcox v. King of Two Sicilies,'20 in which the
court denied a witness the privilege on the grounds that it could not
know as a matter of law the relevant foreign statutes and the witness
would be subject to prosecution only if he were to travel to the foreign
country voluntarily. 12' The Murppy Court noted that neither of these
reasons is relevant in the case of a witness in a domestic court who
fears prosecution in another United States jurisdiction.
Neither rationale of King of Two Sicilies remains persuasive in an
international setting under the Second Circuit's Flanagan approach.
114. 691 F.2d at 124.
115. 699 F.2d at 78.
116. 351 F. Supp. at 1082.
117. This argument is an elaboration of the view expressed in United States v. Trucis, 89
F.R.D. 671. The court there stated that the privilege "is not simply a limit on the activities
of American courts and law enforcement authorities: it is a freedom conferred upon per-
sons within the protection of American law." Id. at 673.
118. 378 U.S. at 67.
119. 378 U.S. at 61-63 (citing United States v. McRae, 3 L.R.-Ch. App. 79 (1867)).
120. 61 Eng. Rep. 116 (1851).
121. 378 U.S. at 67.
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The Flanagan test for determining a real and substantial risk of for-
eign prosecution requires a recalcitrant witness to show that a relevant
foreign law exists, that it is applicable to the particular circumstances,
and that it is likely to be enforced. 122 The argument that to face for-
eign prosecution a witness would have to travel voluntarily to the
country where he faces prosecution ignores the modern-day possibility
of extradition. 123 In Flanagan the government offered assurances that
it would resist efforts to extradite the witness to face charges based
upon his testimony, 124 but in at least one case the government has
refused to give such assurances.125 In either event, however, the wit-
ness "is not dependent for the preservation of his rights on the integ-
rity and good faith of the prosecuting authorities."'' 26 The fifth
amendment privilege against incrimination must therefore be available
to a grand jury witness with a real and substantial fear of foreign
prosecution.
CONCLUSION
The approach taken in Flanagan-that rule 6(e) does not by itself
adequately protect a grand jury witness from foreign incrimination-is
preferable to the contrary holding of courts following the Parker
rationale. If courts adhere to the Flanagan approach, they will be
forced to confront the issue of whether the fifth amendment protects a
witness who reasonably fears that his testimony will incriminate him
in a foreign tribunal. This Note argues that the Constitution compels
courts to permit assertion of the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination in a foreign prosecution.
Sumner J. Koch
122. See supra note 88.
123. A grant of immunity is not a defense to extradition from the United States. See
supra note 15. Recalcitrant witnesses have also contended that being forced to incriminate
themselves abroad impedes their constitutional right to travel. Flanagan also made this
argument, but the court rejected it, noting his privilege against self-incrimination in Ireland
and the United Kingdom. 691 F.2d at 124 & n.7. A constitutional right to international
travel is ill-defined; in any event, it is considerably less strongly established than the right to
domestic interstate travel. See Califano v. Aznaverian, 439 U.S. 170, 176-77 (1978). Anal-
ysis of the validity of witnesses' arguments based upon the right to international travel is
beyond the scope of this Note.
124. 691 F.2d at 124.
125. United States v. Trucis, 89 F.R.D. at 673 n.4.
126. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. at 460.
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